INCOMPETENTS-STERILIZATION-COURT OF EQUITY HAS INHERENT POWER TO EXERCISE MENTALLY RETARDED INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO STERILIZATION-In

re Grady, 85 N.J. 235,

426 A.2d 467 (1981).
Following a "history of isolation and neglect," mentally impaired
individuals are finally gaining recognition of their constitutional
rights.' In this spirit of heightened sensitivity the Supreme Court of
New Jersey recently considered whether the chancery division could
authorize the sterilization of a severely retarded woman absent statutory jurisdiction, and if so, under what circumstances such power
should be exercised. 2 In In re Grady, 3 the court held that the chancery division has inherent jurisdiction to authorize sterilization when
an individual is incapable of making her own decision and sterilization would clearly be in her best interests. 4
Since birth, Lee Ann Grady was afflicted with Down's syndrome, 5 a chromosomal disorder which left her mentally retarded.8 As
an alternative to institutionalization, her parents chose to raise her at
home with her brother and sister.7 Although Lee Ann's intelligence
quotient was within the range of severe mental retardation, 8 she
attended special education classes in the public school system. 9 The
medical evidence indicated that she probably would require lifetime

I In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 245, 426 A.2d 467, 472 (1981) (citing HUMAN SEXUALITY AND
THE MENTALLY RErAnDED 145-46 (F. de la Cruz & C. LaVeck ed. 1973); P. FRIEDMAN, Tie
RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RErARDED PERSONS

(1976)).

2 In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
3 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
4Id.
' Lee Ann's particular variety of the disorder, trisomy 21, is its most common form. In re
Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 102, 405 A.2d 851, 853 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated and remanded, 85
N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). Here, nuclei of the cells in her body contain "47 chromosomes
instead of the usual pair." Id. at 103, 405 A.2d at 853.
6 85 N.J. at 240 & n.1, 426 A.2d at 469 & n.l. Mental retardation is characteristic of the
disorder, and individuals afflicted with Down's syndrome represent the largest identifiable
group among the mentally retarded. In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 103, 405 A.2d 851, 853-54
(Ch. Div. 1979), vacated and remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
7 85 N.J. at 240-41, 426 A.2d at 469-70.
8 In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 106, 405 A.2d 851, 855 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated and
remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). Lee Ann's intelligence quotient was in the upper
twenties to upper thirties. Severe retardation includes intelligence quotient ranges from 20 to 35,
while intelligence quotients between 36 and 51 are within the moderate range. Id. at 105-06, 405
A.2d at 855.
9 85 N.J. at 241, 426 A.2d at 470. Lee Ann has never been institutionalized. Although she
remains unable to read, she can differentiate the letters of the alphabet and manages to write her
name and count low numbers. Id.
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supervision for her support and maintenance because it was unlikely

that there would ever be any significant change in her mental condition.' 0
At age nineteen," Lee Ann's physical maturation and life expectancy were relatively normal.' 2 Due to her severe mental impairment,
however, Lee Ann had little, if any, emotional development with
regard to sexuality. 13 She had no significant comprehension of sexual
relationships, contraception, or procreation, and was incapable of
making rational decisions concerning these issues.' 4 If Lee Ann did
become pregnant and bear a child, she would be unable to care for
is
it.

Lee Ann's parents had hoped to arrange their daughter's future
so as to enable her to live less dependently on her family.16 To this
end, they had hoped to place Lee Ann in a group home for retarded
adults, but believed reliable contraception was a necessary precondition to such a change in environment. 17 Accordingly, they attempted
to have their daughter sterilized by tubal ligation at Morristown
Memorial Hospital. 18
The hospital refused to perform the operation without judicially
authorized consent for Lee Ann.' 9 Consequently, Lee Ann's parents
applied to the superior court, chancery division, for appointment of a

guardian authorized to consent to the procedure on Lee Ann's be-

half.20 The trial judge appointed a guardian ad litem to indepen10In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 102, 405 A.2d 851, 853 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated and
remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
1 Lee Ann was born in 1961. 85 N.J. at 240 n.1, 426 A.2d at 469 n.1. She was 17 years old
when the action was first commenced in the chancery division. See Complaint, In re Grady, 170
N.J. Super. 98, 405 A.2d 851 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated and remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467
(1981).
It 85 N.J. at 241-42, 426 A.2d at 470. Lee Ann did not exhibit many of the physical
infirmities usually associated with Down's syndrome, and her sexual development was physically
normal for her age. Id.
,3 Id. at 242, 426 A.2d at 470.
14 In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 102, 405 A.2d 851, 853 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated and
remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
"s Id. As the supreme court noted, "she will probably need lifetime supervision to care for
her own needs." 85 N.J. at 242, 426 A.2d at 470.
1S85 N.J. at 242, 426 A.2d at 470.
7 Id. Although there is no indication that Lee Ann has been sexually active, her parents have
provided her with birth control pills for the past four years as a purely precautionary measure.
Id.
is Id. The court noted that tubal ligation is a conventional method of sterilization. Id. at
243, 426 A.2d at 470.
I Id. The hospital's action was understandable in light of recent malpractice actions arising
out of similar factual circumstances where sterilization of an allegedly incompetent individual
was permitted without judicially authorized consent. See Downs v. Santelle, 574 F.2d I (1st Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); Gooley v. Moss, 398 N.E.2d 1314 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979); Petro v. McCullough, 385 N.E.2d 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
1185 N.J. at 242-43, 426 A.2d at 470.
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dently represent Lee Ann's interests, ordered a plenary hearing, 2' and
permitted the Public Advocate and the Attorney General to intervene

on behalf of the interests of the public and the state.22
At the hearing, testimony was offered by Lee Ann's father and
various medical experts, and several reports were submitted regarding
her mental condition and abilities. 23 Significantly, no party con-

tended that sterilization could not be ordered in such a case. Rather,
the litigated issues concerned "the standards the court should apply
before deciding to authorize sterilization and whether Lee Ann's situation met those standards." 24 The chancery division granted the
relief sought by the Gradys and appointed them general guardians
over Lee Ann with authority to exercise substituted consent to the
25
sterilization.
In reaching this decision, the chancery division reviewed the
constitutional objections to compulsory sterilization statutes. 26 Ana-

lyzing the constitutional right to privacy as established in the contraception and abortion cases, 2 7 the court recognized that the right to
privacy includes the fundamental right to voluntary sterilization ,28
The court then addressed two New Jersey statutes which delineate the
rights of mentally retarded individuals who are residents or outpatients of certain institutions,2 9 but found them to be inapplicable
3
because Lee Ann was not institutionalized. 0
2' In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 101, 405 A.2d 851, 852-53 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated and
remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). At the request of the guardian ad litem, the initial
proceedings were held in camera. Id.
22 85 N.J. at 243, 426 A.2d at 471.
' Id. Judge Polow, the trial judge, met with Lee Ann to formulate his own conclusions as to
her condition. Aside from this meeting and interviews with the various medical experts, Lee Ann
did not otherwise participate in and was not present at the proceedings. Id.
24

Id.

"I In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 126-27, 405 A.2d 851, 865-66 (Ch.Div. 1979), vacated
and remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).

26 Id. at 109, 405 A.2d at 856-57. Such statutes are usually subjected to strict scrutiny and
have been invalidated on equal protection grounds. Id. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942). But see In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976) (constitutionality of statute
authorizing involuntary sterilization of mentally retarded upheld).
27 See cases listed in notes 45 & 50 infra.
In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 110-11, 405 A.2d 851, 857-58 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated

and remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). In making this determination, the chancery

division cited Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50, 342 A.2d 574 (Ch. Div. 1975) (married
woman has constitutional right to be sterilized without husband's consent). See notes 43-51 infra
and accompanying text.
29 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2 (West 1981) (Bill of Rights for the Mentally Retarded), and
id. § 30:6D-5 (Developmentally Disabled Rights Act). Such individuals, if incapable of giving
informed consent, can be sterilized only upon the substituted consent of a court appointed
guardian. See notes 55-58 infra and accompanying text.
In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 112-17, 405 A.2d 851, 858-61 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated
and remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). See notes 55-58 infra and accompanying text.
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The chancery division concluded that its inherent parens patriae3 ' jurisdiction could be invoked to authorize the parents' substituted consent for Lee Ann's sterilization. 32 To guide the exercise of
this power, the court enumerated a five-part standard which included
both procedural and substantive safeguards. 33 The Public Advocate
and the Attorney General both disagreed with the trial court and
appealed. 34 Before the case could be argued in the appellate division,
however, the guardian ad litem's motion for direct certification was
35

granted.
In In re Grady, the New Jersey supreme court vacated the decision of the trial court, delineated more stringent standards for judicial
authorization of sterilization, and remanded the matter to the chancery division for redetermination in light of the new standards.3 6

31 "Parenspatriae,literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to the role of the state
as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disability to act for themselves such as
juveniles, the insane, or the unknown." West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079,
1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). See generally 67A C.J.S. ParensPatriaeat 159
(1978).
'2 In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 117-22, 405 A.2d 851, 858-61 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated
and remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). While the court acknowledged that in the past
the weight of authority excluded the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction absent statutory
authorization, the court relied upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349 (1978), to reach its conclusion. 170 N.J. Super. at 117-18, 405 A.2d at 861. See notes
101-06 infra and accompanying text for a criticism of this reliance.
" In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 125-26, 405 A.2d 851, 865 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated and
remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981). While the Public Advocate and the Attorney
General argued that a standard of "necessity" should govern, id. at 122, 405 A.2d at 863-64, the
court opined that such a standard would relegate incompetents " 'to the status of second class
citizens.' " Id. at 123, 405 A.2d at 864 (quoting the summation of the guardian ad litem).
Accordingly, the court outlined the following five part standard:
[B]efore this court may exercise its inherent power to grant this application the
following conditions must exist:
1. That the subject is incapable of understanding the nature of the sexual function,
reproduction or sterilization and cannot comprehend the nature of these proceedings, hence is incompetent;
2. That such incompetency is in all likelihood permanent;
3. That the incompetent is presumably not infertile and not incapable of procreation;
4. That all procedural safeguards have been satisfied, including appointment of a
guardian ad litem to act as counsel for the incompetent during court procedings,
with full opportunity to present proofs and cross-examine witnesses;
5. That the applicants have demonstrated their genuine good faith and that their
primary concern is for the best interests of the incompetent rather than their own or
the public's convenience.
Id. at 125-26, 405 A.2d at 865 (footnote omitted).
85 N.J. at 244, 426 A.2d at 471.
In re Grady, 84 N.J. 389, 420 A.2d 317 (1980).
85 N.J. at 244, 426 A.2d at 471.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Pashman first noted the parallel to
the widely publicized dilemma of Karen Ann Quinlan,37 observing
that the underlying paradox was the same-"how ...[to] preserve
the personal freedom of one incapable of exercising it by allowing
others to make a profoundly personal decision on her behalf." 38 Ac-

cordingly, much of the court's analysis was strongly influenced by its
39
earlier holding in In re Quinlan.
At the outset of its analysis the court emphasized the awesome
nature of the sterilization process, noting its direct conflict with the
fundamental right to procreate. 40 The court also traced the history of
abuse surrounding compulsory sterilization of the mentally retarded
and its dubious origins in eugenics. 4 1 After concluding that sterilization in the instant matter was neither "compulsory" nor "voluntary,"
the court created a third category of sterilization-that which "lack[s]
42
personal consent because of a legal disability."
Within the framework of this third category of sterilization the
court outlined the development of the constitutional right of pri3 See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (family of
irreversibly comatose individual being kept alive by extraordinary means given authority to
discontinue treatment with concurrence of treating doctors and hospital's ethics committee).
1 85 N.J. at 240, 426 A.2d at 469.
3970 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See notes 111-20 infra and
accompanying text.
40 85 N.J. at 244-45, 426 A.2d at 471-72 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (right to procreate is fundamental)).
1185 N.J. at 245-46, 426 A.2d at 472-73. Eugenics was defined by its originator "as 'the study
of agencies under social control that may improve or impair .. . future generations either
physically or mentally.' " Id. at 246 n.2, 426 A.2d at 472 n.2 (quoting Ferster, Eliminating the
Unfits-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 591 (1966)). The court also noted the
decision of Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (constitutionality of Virginia compulsory sterilization statute upheld), where it was stated by justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens
for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or
to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly
unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination
is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 197
U.S. 11. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Id. at 207. Although Buck o. Bell has never been expressly overruled, its continued validity is
questionable. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the
Sterilization of HandicappedPersons, 50 TsEm. L.Q. 995, 1023-33 (1977).
42 85 N.J. at 247, 426 A.2d at 473. The court noted that Lee Ann's sterilization could not be
deemed compulsory on the part of the state since her parents and guardian ad litem concurred
that it was in her best interests. Moreover, given her mental condition, it could not be said thit
sterilization "would be against her will." Id. Since Lee Ann could never give informed consent,
labelling the sterilization voluntary was likewise thought to be inappropriate. Id.
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vacy,43 noting that the United States Supreme Court has recognized
the fundamental right to procreate, 44 as well as the complimentary
right to prevent conception by use of contraceptives. 45 Although the
Supreme Court has not given express constitutional recognition to a
right to voluntary sterilization, 46 the court observed that several lower

courts, 47 and at least one New Jersey court, 48 have recognized its

existence. 49 The Grady court also found that such a right was implicit in the Supreme Court's contraception and abortion cases,50 and
concluded that a right to voluntary sterilization derives from both the
federal and New Jersey constitutions. 51
The court next reasoned that implicit in these rights "is the right
to make a meaningful choice between them.1 5 2

Because Lee Ann

Grady was not capable of making such a choice, the court decided
that "[t]o preserve that right and the benefits that a meaningful
decision would bring to her life, it may be necessary to assert it on her
behalf."5 The court held that regardless of who might have the
power to assert that right, the final determination of whether substiId. at 247-50, 426 A.2d at 473-74.
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate is "fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race").
11 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to use contraceptives extends to all
individuals, married or not). See also Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977);
Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
" 85 N.J. at 248, 426 A.2d at 474.
" See Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973); Ruby v. Massey,
452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978); Peck v. Califano, 454 F. Supp. 484 (D. Utah 1977).
4 See Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50, 342 A.2d 574 (Ch. Div. 1975) (married woman
has constitutional right to be sterilized without spouse's consent). The Grady court opined that
the logic of the Quinlan decision also conferred the right to be sterilized, reasoning:
jt]here we held that a person has a constitutional right to discontinue use of artificial
life-sustaining apparatus when the prognosis for returning to cognitive or sapient life
is dim. Our holding grew out of a belief that, under some circumstances, an
individual's personal right to control her own body and life overrides the state's
general interest in preserving life. A decision to be sterilized is also part of an
individual's personal right to control her own body and life. The state's interest in
procreation cannot be greater than its interest in preserving life. If one can decide to
forego artificial life-preservation and thereby sacrifice life, then one can certainly
decide to forego reproductive capacity and thereby relinquish the ability to procreate.
85 N.J. at 249, 426 A.2d at 474.
49 85 N.J. at 247-49, 426 A.2d at 473-74.
50 E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See generally
85 N.J. at 247-51, 426 A.2d at 473-74. In the opinion of the court, these cases "expanded the
right to control one's own body." Id. at 248, 426 A.2d at 473.
51 85 N.J. at 249-50, 426 A.2d at 474.
51 Id. at 250, 426 A.2d at 474.
53 Id. at 250-51, 426 A.2d at 475.
43
"
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tuted consent to sterilization should be authorized must be made by
an appropriate court.54
The majority rejected the argument made by both the Attorney
General and the Public Advocate that the standards and procedural
guidelines set forth in sections 30:4-24.2(d)(2) (Bill of Rights for the
Mentally Retarded) and 30:60-5(a)(4) (Developmentally Disabled
Rights Act) of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated5s governed the
Gradys' request for substituted consent. 56 The court recognized that
if these statutes controlled, the "necessity" of the proposed sterilization
would have to be proved by the Gradys, and Lee Ann would have to
be present at the hearing. 57 Because the statutory language referred
only to those patients who were institutionalized or outpatients of
certain facilities, of which Lee Ann was neither, the court agreed with

m Id. at 251, 426 A.2d at 475. The court recognized that this was a departure from Quinlan,
where it was held that the final determination to discontinue the hopelessly comatose Karen Ann
Quinlan's artificial life support rested with the guardian and her family, not with the court. Id.
at 250-51, 426 A.2d at 474-75. Nonetheless, the Grady court acknowledged that a greater
involvement by the courts was necessary in light of past abuses with regard to sterilization of the
mentally impaired. Id. at 251-52, 426 A.2d at 475.
m N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-24.2(d)(2),:6D-5(a)(4) (West 1981). Section 30:4-24.2(d)(2) provides that each patient has a right:
Not to be subjected to experimental research, shock treatment, psychosurgery or
sterilization, without the express and informed consent of the patient after consultation with counsel or interested party of the patient's choice. Such consent shall be
made in writing, a copy of which shall be placed in the patient's treatment record. If
the patient has been adjudicated incompetent a court of competent jurisdiction shall
hold a hearing to determine the necessity of such procedure at which the client is
physically present, represented by counsel, and provided the right and opportunity
to be confronted with and to cross-examine all witnesses alleging the necessity of
such procedures. In such proceedings, the burden of proof shall be on the party
alleging the necessity of such procedures.
Id. § 30:4-24.2(d)(2).
Section 30:6D-5(a)(4) provides that patients receiving treatment at a facility shall not:
be subjected to shock treatment, psychosurgery, sterilization or medical behavioral
or pharmacological research without the express and informed consent of such
person, if a competent adult, or of such person's guardian ad litem specifically
appointed by a court for the matter of consent to these proceedings, if a minor or an
incompetent adult or a person administratively determined to be mentally deficient.
Such consent shall be made in writing and shall be placed in such person's record.
Either the party alleging the necessity of such procedure or such person or such
person's guardian ad litem may petition a court of competent jurisdiction to hold a
hearing to determine the necessity of such procedure at which the client is physically
present, represented by counsel, and provided the right and opportunity to be
confronted with and to cross-examine all witnesses alleging the necessity of such
procedure. In such proceedings, the burden of proof shall be on the party alleging
the necessity of such procedure.
Id. § 30:6D-5(a)(4).
" 85 N.J. at 253, 426 A.2d at 476.
s

Id.
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the trial judge that the legislature
could not have intended the statutes
58
to govern in this situation.

Instead, the court found that the inherent parens patriae power
of the chancery division conveyed sufficient jurisdiction for that court
to decide the sterilization issue. 59 Consequently, by making sterilization available to noninstitutionalized as well as institutionalized individuals, the court avoided the equal protection argument which otherwise might have arisen.6 0 Although the court acknowledged that the
weight of authority did not support a determination of jurisdiction, 6'
it concluded that these decisions "[did] not reflect adequate sensitivity
to the constitutional rights of the incompetent person," and instead
"agree[d] with the minority of courts that have found inherent power
to decide these issues."6 2 In addition, the court opined that New

" Id. at 256-58, 426 A.2d at 478-79.
" Id. at 258-59, 426 A.2d at 479.
00 Id. The equal protection problem was noted by the trial court. If jurisdiction were to stem
solely from the statutes, it was argued that institutionalized persons would have access to
sterilization while noninstitutionalized persons would not. In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98,
118-19, 405 A.2d 851, 861-62 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated and remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d
467 (1981). See Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978) (noninstitutionalized
mentally retarded individuals granted same access to sterilization procedures as provided to
institutionalized individuals by statute on an equal protection basis).
61 85 N.J. at 260-61, 426 A.2d at 480. The following decisions have held that a court lacks
jurisdiction to authorize the sterilization of an incompetent individual absent legislative authority: Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349 (1978); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Hudson v.
Hudson, 373 So.2d 310 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1979); Guardianship of Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146
Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979); Guardianship of Kemp, 43 Cal. App.
3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144 (Del. Ch. 1977); A.L. v. C.R.H.,
163 Ind. App. 636, 325 N.E.2d 501 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Holmes v. Powers,
439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974); In re A.D., 90
Misc.2d 236, 394 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sur. Ct. 1977), affd on other grounds, 64 A.D.2d 898, 408
N.Y.S.2d 104 (1978); In re Lambert, No. 61-156 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1976),noted in 44
TEzNN. L. REv. 879 (1977); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); In re
Eberhardy, 97 Wis. 2d 654, 294 N.W.2d 540 (1980). See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 1210
(1976); see also Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 1224 (1976).
16 85 N.J. at 261, 426 A.2d at 480. Only a few courts have found jurisdiction without express
legislative authorization. See C.D.M. v. State, 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1981) (decided
subsequent to New Jersey supreme court's holding in Grady); Ex parte Eaton. Baltimore Daily
Record, Nov. 12, 1954 (Md, Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 1954), cited in O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic
Sterilization, 45 Co.L.J. 20, 39 (1956); In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989
(Sup. Ct. 1976); In re Simpson, 80 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d
228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980); cf. Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978) (noninstitutionalized individuals granted same access to sterilization procedures as provided to institutionalized
individuals by statute on an equal protection basis). See also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978) (Indiana circuit court judge had jurisdiction to entertain petition for authorization of
minor's sterilization and therefore was entitled to judicial immunity). But see notes 100-05 infra
and accompanying text.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:96

Jersey case law provided an ample basis for invoking patens patriae
6 3
jurisdiction.

Following its disposition of the jurisdiction issue, the court considered circumstances under which sterilization could be judicially

authorized. The Public Advocate argued that strict necessity must first
be demonstrated "because the State's interest in authorizing steriliza-

tion is limited to preventing the birth of genetically defective children

6
and children whose parents are unable to provide adequate care.- 4

The court flatly rejected this contention, however, finding that the
state's interest is not in authorizing sterilization for the benefit or
convenience of society, but rather is only in authorizing sterilization
when it is in the best interests of the incompetent individual.6 5 Furthermore, the majority iterated that the court, and not the parents,

must ultimately determine whether sterilization is warranted. 6
Adopting the procedural safeguards enunciated by the trial
court,6 7 the court decided that whenever an application for sterilization is made, an independent guardian ad litem must be appointed to
represent the interests of the incompetent individual.8 8 In addition,
independent psychological and medical evaluations must be conducted and the results thereof presented to the court.6 9 Furthermore,

63 85 N.J. at 259-62, 426 A.2d at 479-81. The court opined that "compelling considerations"
similar to those which justified judicial intervention in Quinlan were also present in this case. Id.
at 260, 426 A.2d at 480. Other holdings supporting jurisdiction include State v. Perricone, 37
N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962) (court authorized blood transfusions
over objections of minor's parents);In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372 A.2d 360 (Ch. Div.
1977) (court authorized amputation of incompetent adult's leg); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson,
128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (Law Div. 1974) (court authorized blood transfusions over
objections of minor's parents).
85 N.J. at 262, 426 A.2d at 481.
65 Id. at 262 & n.8, 426 A.2d at 481 & n.8. The court feared that by adopting a necessity
standard, it would appear to lend its imprimatur to compulsory sterilization. Id. at 262-63 & nn.
8 & 9, 426 A.2d at 481 & nn.8 & 9.
w Id. at 264, 426 A.2d at 482. See note 54 supra and accompanying text. Although it is true
that " 'the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,' " the Grady court
concluded that because the constitutional rights under consideration were so personal to the
individual any decision to be made lies with the individual and not the parent. Id. (quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). Where the individual is incompetent,
responsiblility falls upon the court to decide whether sterilization is in his or her best interests.
Id. (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662 (1979) and Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976)). For a discussion of the potential conflict of interest between the parents and
their incompetent child, see Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?,
62 CAL. L. REv. 917, 932-34 (1974). See generally Comment, Sterilization, Retardation, and
ParentalAuthority, 1978 B.Y.L. R-v. 380 (1978).
67 85 N.J. at 264, 426 A.2d at 482.
8 Id. The guardian ad litem must be afforded access to the incompetent individual and be
able to "represent zealously the interests of his ward." Id.
64 Id.
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the trial judge must personally meet with the alleged incompetent
individual in order to form his own impressions regarding compe70
tency.
Once these procedural safeguards have been employed, the trial
judge must then determine whether the individual is in fact incapable
of choosing between sterilization and procreation, and if so, whether
this incapacity is permanent. 7' The importance of this aspect was
underscored by the court's observation that many retarded persons are
fully capable of making such a decision. 72 For this reason, the court
held that the party seeking sterilization must prove incapacity "by

clear and convincing evidence."
Finally, the trial court must determine whether sterilization is
truly in the best interests of the incompetent individual. 74 Like the
determination of capacity, this also must be based on "clear and
convincing" evidence. 75 Establishing its own best interests test, the
Grady court adopted standards more stringent than those of the trial
court in order to eliminate potential abuse of judicial authority. 76 The
court outlined nine factors to be considered in making this determination:
(1) The possibility that the incompetent person can become pregnant. There need be no showing that pregnancy is likely. The court
can presume fertility if the medical evidence indicates normal development of sexual organs and the evidence does not otherwise
raise doubts about fertility.
(2) The possibility that the incompetent person will experience
trauma or psychological damage if she becomes pregnant or gives
birth, and, conversely, the possibility of trauma or psychological
damage from the sterilization operation.

7. Id. at 265, 426 A.2d at 482. Every opportunity should be afforded the incompetent
individual to voice his or her opinion on the proposed sterilization. Id. See In re Hayes, 93 Wash.
2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980). The incompetent individual need not be present at the proceedings,
however, if physical presence is unnecessary to protect his or her interests. 85 N.J. at 265, 426
A.2d at 482.
71 85 N.J. at 265, 426 A.2d at 482-83.
7 Id. (citing Neuwirth, Heisler & Coldrich, Capacity, Competence, Consent: Voluntary
Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded, 6 COLUM. HUMAN PaRciHs L. REv. 447, 449-53 (1974 -

1975)). One authority has suggested that at least 90 % of the individuals categorized as mentally
retarded suffer only mild retardation and are fully able to make decisions regarding sterilization.
Murdock, supra note 66, at 933.
85 N.J. at 265, 426 A.2d at 483 (emphasis in original).
IId. at 266, 426 A.2d at 483.
Id. (emphasis in original).
I3
76 Id. at 263, 426 A.2d at 482.
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(3) The likelihood that the individual will voluntarily engage in

sexual activity or be exposed to situations where sexual intercourse
is imposed upon her.
(4) The inability of the incompetent person to understand reproduction or contraception and the likely permanence of that inability.
(5) The feasibility and medical advisability of less drastic means of
contraception, both at the present time and under foreseeable future circumstances.
(6) The advisability of sterilization at the time of the application

rather than in the future. While sterilization should not be postponed until unwanted pregnancy occurs, the court should be cautious not to authorize sterilization before it already has become an
advisable procedure.
(7) The ability of the incompetent person to care for a child, or the
possibility that the incompetent may at some future date be able to

marry and, with a spouse, care for a child.
(8) Evidence that scientific or medical advances may occur within
the foreseeable future which will make possible either improvement of the individual's condition or alternative and less drastic
sterilization procedures.
(9) A demonstration that the proponents of sterilization are seeking
it in good faith and that their primary concern is for the best
interests of the incompetent person rather than their own or the
77
public's convenience.

Because it was unclear whether the trial court used a clear and
convincing standard of proof in its "best interests" determination, and
because stricter standards were adopted, the court deemed it neces78
sary to remand for further proceedings.

77 Id. at 266-67, 426 A.2d at 483. It was noted that these factors were not exclusive. Id. at
266-67, 426 A.2d at 483. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the clear and convincing standard
applies to the findings as a whole, and not to each individual consideration. Id. at 267, 426 A.2d
at 483. Finally, the court indicated that a similar analysis would pertain where the incompetent
individual was male, although some of the factors would not apply. Id. at 267 n.10, 426 A.2d at
483 n.10.
78 Id. at 267-72, 426 A.2d at 483-86. The trial court had set forth a more limited five point
test. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. Upon remand Judge Polow denied the parents'
application, holding that although sterilization was proper under the supreme court's standards,
the procedure would presently be premature. This determination was based on the finding that
there currently was little likelihood of sexual activity since Lee Ann would continue to live at
home for another year. Judge Polow left the door open to future sterilization by inviting a
renewal of the application if Lee Ann were to be placed in a group living arrangement, thereby
increasing the possibility of sexual activity. In re Grady, No. C-1917-78E (N.J. Super. Ct., Ch.
Div. Aug. 3, 1981).
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Handler reflected his general
agreement with the majority's opinion and the standards enunciated
therein, but maintained that their "articulation of. . .[the appropriate] standards [was] somewhat misdirected and potentially misleading." 7 The justice urged that the standards outlined by the majority
amounted to a requirement of necessity, and that such a showing was
"an extremely important, if not an indispensable predicate" to judicial
authorization of sterilization. 80 He further contended that although
the New Jersey statutes8 ' addressed by the majority did not directly
govern, their broad objectives should still have been taken into account.82 Justice Handler reasoned that because the statutes imposed a
necessity standard, such a requirement is implicit in the majority's
opinion. 3 Finally, he indicated that although the majority maintained that clear and convincing evidence regarding the various factors in the best interests determination was only necessary in the
aggregate, "substantial proofs with respect to all facets" should be
84
required.
An examination of the legal issues posed by Grady entails a
twofold analysis. First, it must be determined whether the court has
jurisdiction to authorize sterilization. Once jurisdiction is established,
it must then be ascertained under what circumstances such power
should be exercised. Surprisingly, none of the parties really contested
the threshold issue of jurisdiction.8 5 Instead, much of the litigation
centered on the appropriate standards by which to guide judicial
intervention. 86 Nonetheless, much of the Grady opinion, 87 and most
of the applicable case law,8 8 involved resolution of the arduous issue of
jurisdiction.
As noted in the Grady decision, the existing weight of authority
holds that absent legislation a court lacks jurisdiction to authorize the
79 85 N.J. at 273, 426 A.2d at 486 (Handler, J.,concurring).
"o Id. at 273-75, 426 A.2d at 486-87 (Handler, J., concurring). In a footnote, the majority
expressly rejected Justice Handler's analysis of necessity, stating that "[a] necessity standard
would result in an unacceptable degree of State interference in the exercise of these rights

concerning sterilization." Id. at 263 n.9, 426 A.2d at 481 n.9.
81 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-24.2(d)(2), :6D-5(a)(4). See note 55 supra and accompanying

text.
81 85 N.J. at 275, 426 A.2d at 487 (Handler, J.,concurring).
83 Id. at 276, 426 A.2d at 488 (Handier, J., concurring).
84 Id.

" Id. at 243, 426 A.2d at 471. The Attorney General and the Public Advocate did contend,
however, that the standards and procedures enumerated in the statutes governed the instant

procedings. See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
" See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
"

85 N.J. at 250-62, 426 A.2d at 474-81. See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text.

S

See authorities listed in notes 61 & 62 supra.
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sterilization of an incompetent individual. 89 The basis for such hold-

ings, however, is not entirely clear. In a recent case, the Supreme
Court of Alabama indicated that "[t]he profound nature of the constitutional issues raised ... and the irreversible character of the physical
consequences of the requested relief preclude judicial resolution absent legislative action." 90 This language, as well as the language of

similar holdings, 91 implies that the reluctance to act is more an exercise of judicial restraint than the existence of a total bar to jurisdic92

tion.1

Undoubtedly, Wade v. Bethesda Hospital9 3 and Sparkman v.

McFarlin94 were of primary influence in many of those decisions
which declined jurisdiction. In Wade, an individual who had been
sterilized pursuant to a court order brought suit in federal district

court against the Ohio probate judge 5 who authorized the sterilization. 98 The court held that the judge acted wholly without jurisdic-

tion in ordering plaintiff's sterilization because there was no enabling
legislation, and that he was therefore not entitled to any judicial
immunity.9 7 In Sparkman, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit reached a similar result in an action brought against an Indiana judge.9 8 Confronted with the prospect of potential liability, it is
thus not surprising that many courts have declined jurisdiction to
authorize sterilization. Although one such court expressed its disagree-

ment with Sparkman, noting that "a mentally retarded child is penalized if she is fortunate enough to have parents who... elect to keep
her at home," it nonetheless felt compelled to decline jurisdiction
because of the federal court's holding. 99
8185

N.J. at 260-61, 426 A.2d at 480.

90 Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So.2d 310, 312 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1979).
9' See, e.g., Guardianship of Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 701, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266, 268
(1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979) ("awesome power . . . must derive from specific
legislative authorization.").
'2 None of these holdings "demonstrates any controlling legal principle prohibiting a court of
general jurisdiction from acting upon i petition for sterilization. They suggest instead a preference that the difficult decisions regarding sterilization be made by a legislative body. This is not
simply a denial of jurisdiction, but an abdication of the judicial function." In re Hayes, 93 Wash.
2d 228, 231, 608 P.2d 635, 637 (1980); see also id. at 240, 608 P.2d at 642 (Stafford, J.,
concurring specially in part and dissenting in part).
93 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
9' 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
11 The same Ohio probate judge had issued what is probably the only reported decision prior
to 1976 holding that a court has jurisdiction to authorize the sterilization of a mental incompetent absent specific legislation. See In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio P. Ct. 1962).
96 337 F. Supp. at 672.
01 Id. at 673-74.
91 552 F.2d at 174-76.
99 In re S.C.E., 378 A.2d 144, 145 (Del. Ch. 1977).
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109

In Stump v. Sparkman, 00 the United States Supreme Court,
reversing the Seventh Circuit decision, held that the judge who or-

dered the sterilization was entitled to judicial immunity.10' The
Stump holding, however, is not persuasive authority for the proposition that a court has jurisdiction to sanction the sterilization of a
mentally incompetent individual absent legislation, 02 since the scope3
0

of the court's holding is limited to the issue of judicial immunity.
Although some courts have erroneously relied on Stump to support a

finding of inherent jurisdiction, 0 4 the New Jersey supreme court correctly refrained from citing it for this proposition. 0 5 Instead, the
Grady court found sufficient justification for a court to exercise such
06
jurisdiction in the case law relating to parens patriae jurisdiction
and in the need to adequately consider the incompetent individual's
07
constitutional rights in toto.
Grady is one of the first decisions of this nature to give counte-

nance to an incompetent individual's right to be sterilized. 08 While
most courts have simply ignored this right, 0 9 the Supreme Court of

New Jersey has determined that a retarded individual deserves a
choice between sterilization and procreation despite his or her incom-

petence." 0 Substantial precedent for this conclusion was found in
Quinlan because inherent similarities exist between the plight of a
1 435 U.S. 349 (1978), rev'g sub nom. Sparkman v. MeFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977).
101 Id. at 355-64.

101 See C.D.M. v. State, 627 P.2d 607, 615-16 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1981) (Matthews, J., dissenting); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 247-48, 608 P.2d 635, 646 (1980) (Rosellini, J., dissenting);
In re Eberhardy, 97 Wis. 2d 654, 667, 294 N.W.2d 540, 546-47 (Ct. App. 1980).
103The Court merely held that the judge had jurisdiction to entertain the action and was
therefore entitled to judicial immunity, noting that under Indiana case law the "judge would err
as a matter of law if he were to approve" the requested sterilization. 435 U.S. at 358-59.
10 Both In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 118, 405 A.2d 351, 361 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated
and remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981), and In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 231-32, 608
P.2d 635, 637-38 (1980), relied on the Stump holding.
h05Although the supreme court did not rely upon the Stump decision, it did note it in its
citation to the Seventh Circuit's holding in Sparkman. See 85 N.J. at 261, 426 A.2d at 480.
ISO See notes 31 & 63 supra and accompanying text.
107 See notes 46-54 supra and accompanying text.
108Judge Polow's decision in In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 405 A.2d 851 (Ch. Div. 1979),
vacated and remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981), was one of the first substantial
opinions on this topic to recognize the mentally retarded individual's right to sterilization. Id. at
110-12, 405 A.2d at 857-58. See also Rubey v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 366 (D. Conn. 1978).
One considerable opinion decided prior to the Supreme Court of New Jersey's holding in Grady,
In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980), reached the same result as Grady but did not
expressly consider the constitutional right to sterilization.
1o Most courts denying jurisdiction neglect the incompetent's constitutional right to sterilization, recognizing only that the right to procreate is fundamental. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson,
373 So.2d 310, 311 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1979).
11085 N.J. at 250, 426 A.2d at 474.
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retarded individual incapable of consenting to sterilization and that of
a comatose person unable to acquiesce in the discontinuance of artificial life sustaining treatment."'
Quinlan involved a twenty-one year old woman who, due to
extensive brain damage, was "in a chronic and persistent 'vegetative'
state, having no awareness of anything or anyone around her and
existing at a primitive reflex level."" 2 All of the medical evidence
indicated that Karen Ann Quinlan's comatose condition was irreversible, and that her life was being artificially sustained by use of a
respirator and intravenous feeding." 3 Because there was no hope for
his daughter's recovery, Karen Ann's father applied to the chancery
division seeking appointment as guardian with power to authorize
discontinuance of the extraordinary medical treatment." 4
The New Jersey supreme court posited that the comatose patient's right to privacy encompasses the right "to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces," and that
Karen Ann was entitled to have this right "asserted on her behalf by
her guardian."115 The court went on to hold that if a hospital ethics
committee as well as the treating physicians concurred in the determination that there was "no reasonable possiblity of [Karen Ann] ever
emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient
state," then the artificial life support system could be removed without civil or criminal liability." 6
Despite the similarities between Quinlan and Grady, these two
situations are substantially distinguishable. Prior to her affliction,
Karen Ann Quinlan was a competent individual. 1 7 Had Karen Ann
been able to momentarily regain consciousness, she herself could have
decided to discontinue the extraordinary medical treatment." 8 Lee
Ann, on the other hand, had been retarded since birth and was never
capable of formulating a sterilization decision." 9 Thus, a truly sub'"

Id.

112 70 N.J. at 25, 355 A.2d at

655.

13 Id. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655-56.
114Id. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
I's Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
116Id. at 54-55, 355 A.2d at 671-72.

See id. at 21, 355 A.2d at 653.
118 Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. Evidence was offered that Karen Ann had expressed her
disapproval of artificial life prolonging treatment while competent, thus indicating her desire to
terminate treatment. The court concluded that these statements lacked sufficient probative value
because they were not made while Karen Ann was in similar circumstances and therefore did not
consider them in its determination. Id.
"O See In re Grady, 170 N.J. Super. 98, 102, 405 A.2d 851, 853 (Ch. Div. 1979), vacated and
remanded, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
17
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jective determination could not be made on her behalf.12 0 Right to
die cases subsequent to Quinlan, however, have examined the issue of
judicially authorized substituted consent specifically within the context of mentally impaired individuals. Consequently, these cases provide a more relevant framework for analysis of the Grady dilemma.
In Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz,' 2 1 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that life prolonging chemotherapy treatment could be withheld from a mentally retarded individual
afflicted with terminal leukemia. Although the individual was never
capable of important decision-making, the Massachusetts Court utilized a "substituted judgment" standard,'12 2 a subjective approach that
seems misapplied in the context of the mentally retarded individual. 23 Nonetheless, the court reasoned that the objective should be
"to ascertain the incompetent person's actual interests and preferences,"124 thereby attempting to reach the decision "which would be
made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but
taking into account the present and future incompetency of the individual."'' 25 While urging that this determination be "subjective in
nature," the court recognized that "it may be necessary to rely.

. .

on

6
objective criteria." 12
Under similar circumstances, the New York Court of Appeals
reasoned that a subjective determination would be impractical. In In

See In re Grady, 85 N.J. at 274, 426 A.2d at 487 (Handler, J.,concurring).
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
Iu
Id. at 750-53, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31.
1 See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 380, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73, 428 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274-75
(1981).
21 373 Mass. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
Id. Cf. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (utilization of substituted
I,
judgment to authorize removal of incompetent's kidney for purpose of transplant into brother).
See generally Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment
Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48 (1976).
128373 Mass. at 750-51, 370 N.E.2d at 430. The substituted judgment approach was reaf"~

'

firmed by the Massachusetts court in In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980). The
court found that life prolonging hemodialysis treatment could be withdrawn from an elderly
man who was suffering from a terminal kidney disease and was unable to give informed consent
due to senility. The court held that the trial judge had properly applied the substituted judgment
doctrine, and concluded that the incompetent would have refused the treatment if able to make
this decision in light of his incompetence. Id. at 634, 405 N.E.2d at 118-20. Interestingly, this
finding was made despite the fact that the individual had acquiesced to the treatment prior to
becoming incompetent. Id. at 636, 405 N.E.2d at 120. The substituted judgment doctrine as
applied by the Saikewicz court has been criticized because it results in treatment being withheld
from an incompetent individual that would not be refused by most competent persons, thus
creating the possibility of equating "a right to die by proxy with a requisite quality of life."
Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A ProsecutorialView of the Quinlan Case, 30 RurrcERs L.
Rzv. 304, 327 (1977). Although the Saikewicz court expressly rejected any "quality of life"
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re Storar,21 7 the highest New York court held that blood transfusions
could not be withheld from a severely retarded individual afflicted
with terminal bladder cancer. The court acknowledged that a competent patient has a right to refuse medical treatment, but indicated that
where an individual has always been incompetent "it is unrealistic to
attempt to determine whether he would want to continue potentially
life prolonging treatment if he were competent."12 8 In the same
opinion, the court considered the case of an irreversibly comatose
Catholic Brother who had previously expressed a desire not to have his
life artificially prolonged should he meet the same fate as Karen Ann
Quinlan. Because it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that
he had previously indicated his desire not to receive treatment, it was
held that the court could exercise
his personal right and authorize the
29
discontinuance of treatment.
These cases, by analyzing the problem of consent in terms of the
incompetent individual's full spectrum of constitutional rights and the
court's ability to assert them on their behalf, support a finding of
jurisdiction in Grady. Because the Massachusetts court's holding in
Saikewicz concerns the termination of life itself, it exemplifies a more
profound exercise of substituted consent than Grady. Even the Storar
holding, which implicitly rejects a subjective exercise of substituted
consent, 30 supports jurisdiction within the Grady context by considering the retarded patient's right to decline medical treatment, and by
not precluding the court's exercise of this right under different circumstances. Considering Quinlan in conjunction with these cases, it is
clear that the Grady court reached the correct result on the issue of
jurisdiction.
The remaining analysis of the court's holding centers on the
appropriate standards to be utilized when considering sterilization.
The Grady court adopted a "best interest" standard and rejected the
necessity requirement urged by the Public Advocate and Attorney
General.' 3' As discussed in the concurring opinion, however, there is

considerations, 373 Mass. at 754, 370 N.E.2d at 432, the Spring court's holding that an individual would acquiesce to treatment while competent, but decline treatment once incompetent,
gives added credence to this criticism.
12752 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 148 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
129 Id. at 376-80, 420 N.E.2d at 70-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-74. The court thereby implicitly
rejected the subjective substituted judgment approach utilized by the Massachusetts courts.
121Id. Although it did not reach the issue, the implication of the court's holding is that absent
such a showing the court will not authorize the discontinuance of treatment.
130See note 128 supra and accompanying text.
31 See notes 64, 65 & 74 supra and accompanying text.
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some question as to the actual distinction between
a necessity require32

ment and the approach adopted by the court.
In its analysis of necessity, the Grady majority employed the
definition of necessity advanced by the Public Advocate. This definition stressed two factors: the probability of sexual activity or pregnancy, and the "availability of feasible, less drastic means of contraception."'' 33 Both of these considerations are incorporated into four
of the majority's nine factors listed for its "best interests" determina-

tion. 13 For this reason Justice Handler opined that a necessity standard was implicit in the majority's holding.135 The majority responded
to this contention in a footnote, charging that "[tlhe concurring opinion misconstrues our position on a showing of necessity, a position that

we have stated clearly." 136 Actually, the two opinions only differ in
degree, with Justice Handler ascribing greater significance to the
factors urged by the Public Advocate.
The majority's rejection of "necessity" raises the question of what
impact the Grady holding will have on the interpretation of sections

30:4-24.2 and 30:6D-5 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated

37 which

require a demonstration of necessity.' 3 Arguably, an equal protection problem could arise if an individual governed by the statutes
were unable to satisfy the necessity requirement, but would otherwise

qualify for sterilization under the Grady standards. 3 9 Moreover,
since the court held that an incompetent individual has a constitutional right to sterilization,140 the necessity requirement of the statutes
should not be used to deny access to sterilization beyond the limits set

32 See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
"1 85 N.J. at 262, 426 A.2d at 481.

131Id. at 266, 426 A.2d at 483 (factors 1, 3, 5, & 8).
"'
Id. at 273-75, 426 A.2d at 486-87 (Handler, J.,concurring).
1 85 N.J. at 263 n.9, 426 A.2d at 481 n.9. The footnote goes on to maintain that the adopted
standards are more protective than those of the concurrence or the statutes. It is then stated that
adoption of a necessity standard "might prevent an individual who wishes to be sterilized from
being so." Id. This observation is incomprehensible. If an individual "wishes to be sterilized," she
would necessarily be capable of consenting to the procedure herself. If, however, her mental
state were such that she were incapable of giving informed consent, her "wishes" would lack
sufficient probative value and would therefore be irrelevant.
The footnote next suggests that "adoption of a necessity standard might also result in the
imposition of sterilization upon someone against his wishes." Id. To claim that a pre-requisite
demonstration of the likelihood of sexual activity or pregnancy and the unavailability of less
drastic alternative forms of contraception (the instant definition of necessity) somehow connotates a justification of compulsory sterilization defies explanation.
' N.J. SrAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-24.2, :6D-5 (West 1981).
,38See notes 29, 55, & 57 supra and accompanying text.
See Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978).
11085 N.J. at 249-50, 426 A.2d at 474.
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forth in Grady. Consequently, the standards enunciated in Grady are
likely to have the effect of superseding the statutory requirement of
necessity.

141

The Grady holding delineates three conditions which must be
satisfied before a court can authorize a sterilization: 1) procedural
safeguards must be followed; 2) the individual must lack the capacity
to make her own decision; and 3) sterilization must be in the individual's best interests. 42 These prerequisites provide sufficient protection from potential abuses which might otherwise occur. 4 3 While
any "best interest" determination is an imperfect process, the nine
non-exclusive factors listed by the court provide ample guidelines for
the decision.

144

In addition to its effect on access to sterilization, the Grady
holding is likely to affect the mentally impaired individual's exercise
of other rights which require informed consent. Most notable of these
are abortion and the right to refuse medical treatment. Although the
United States Supreme Court has not yet made such a determination
regarding sterilization, the Court has expressly held that the right to
privacy includes the right to an abortion. 45 Accordingly, the procedures and standards utilized in Grady should be applied to effectuate
the mentally impaired individual's right to abortion in the same manner used to afford access to sterilization. Thus, if the procedural
safeguards are followed and it is shown that the individual is incapaif it is
ble of making her own choice, a court can authorize an abortion
46
individual.
impaired
mentally
the
of
in the "best interests"
Under the combined holdings of Quinlan and Grady it is also
clear that New Jersey should allow a court to exercise a mentally
incompetent individual's right to decline life prolonging medical
treatment. Quinlan established that an individual has a right to de47
cline life prolonging treatment under certain circumstances,'
whereas Grady demonstrated that courts have a duty to assert such
141This likelihood gives added credence to Justice Handler's views on necessity. See note 136

supra and accompanying text. Had the majority simply held that necessity was implicit in its
standards, the same result would have been obtained and the problem would have been avoided.
14285 N.J. at 264-66, 426 A.2d at 482-83.
"I For examples of past abuses, see Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977),
rev'd sub nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp.
671 (S.D. Ohio 1971); cases listed in note 19 supra.
144See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
145E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court
has not spoken directly on the right to sterilization. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
148 Of course, since the nature of abortion differs from sterilization, the factors in the "best
interests" determination will necessarily differ.
14770 N.J. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
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115

rights on behalf of the mentally impaired individual.148 Thus, when
considering the propriety of withholding life prolonging treatment
from a mentally retarded individual, the court should employ an
analysis similar to Grady and utilize a "best interests" determination.
Such an approach would be more reasonable than the substituted
49
judgment method adopted by the Saikewicz court.
The Grady court's decision recognizes the mentally impaired
individual's sincere need for access to sterilization, while at the same
time insuring that adequate protections are employed. By giving
equal weight to the right to procreate and the right to sterilization,
the decision enables a mentally impaired individual to come closer to
attaining the same constitutional status as a competent individual.
Equally significant, the Grady holding affords an individual capable
of making his or her own choice an opportunity to refuse unwanted
sterilization, 50 and expressly rejects any form of involuntary sterilization. 15 Nonetheless, where the right to procreate is not of primary
importance to an individual, that right should not be used to deprive
her of a "richer and more active life" which may only be provided by
the permanent elimination of the risk of pregnancy. 52
James R. Ottobre
14S 85

N.J. at 250-51, 426 A.2d at 474-75.

I1 See notes 122-26 supra and accompanying text.

150The holding requires that the individual be incapable of making the decision on her own,
and that she be afforded every opportunity to voice her opinion on the proposed sterilization. 85
N.J. at 265, 426 A.2d at 482-83. Thus, an individual capable of forming an opinion on the
matter can refuse the procedure.
1-1 "[N]othing in this opinion should be read as approving compulsory sterilization." Id. at
262 n.8, 426 A.2d at 481 n.8.
"5t Id. at 273, 426 A.2d at 486.

